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Abstract 
 This paper explores the effect of a diesel price on trade flows across space within the U.S.  
Using a structural gravity model applied to the U.S. inter-state trade, we find diesel price has a 
significant negative effect on interstate trade, and that trade between any pair of states is more 
sensitive to an oil price shock the farther away the states are from one another.  Exemplifying 
this in a general equilibrium, a 10% increase in diesel price decreases trade from Massachusetts 
to California by 2.9%, but only by 0.47% to New York, accounting for a 2.43 percentage point 
difference.  At the same time Massachusetts increases trade within its own borders by 0.53%.  In 
general, we can see that trade becomes more local (or regional) when fuel costs rise.  Finally, 
such a modest increase of diesel price leads  to non-uniform state welfare effects, with a median 
0.69% real GDP loss, amounting to a total income loss of $82 billion nationwide. 
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I. Introduction 
 The last 15 years has seen a dramatic rise in oil prices to the point of record high $147 a 
barrel, as well as prices falling off a cliff to $30/barrel.  Large volatility has been persistent, 
showing no signs of going away through 2016.  The implications of these oil price shocks on the 
economy are still being explored but such fluctuations are bound to have an effect on trade 
dynamics. Expectedly, higher prices should act as a stronger friction, distorting and dampening 
trade.  Consequently, such a price shock will eat away at gains from trade and affect social 
welfare. Yet, the degree and distributional attributes are much cloudier and need to be 
investigated.  The purpose of this paper is to explore the oil price and trade relationship across 
distance and shed light on distributional effects and welfare effects of oil price shocks. 
Trade flows between two geographic areas are, not only determined by relative 
endowments, but a set of costs which act as a friction to reduce trade. This can be conceptually 
understood from Samuelson’s iceberg transportation cost model (1954), in which a portion of 
volume melts away.  It is understood that transportation costs increase with distance, and thus it 
is popular to use distance as a proxy in bilateral trade costs.  However, as Head and Mayer 
(2014, pg 189) note, underlying factors of trade costs are still murky; traditional distance effects 
are consistent yet seem too large, and  its form does not proxy transportation costs as well as it 
could.  Specifically, the transportation cost and distance relationship is likely to be non-linear.  
For instance, energy prices in the form of oil, specifically derived petroleum products such as 
diesel fuel, are a major input of transportation of goods and make trade more costly.  However, 
fuel prices will not impact all trade flows in the same way.  That is, a higher price creates a 
relatively larger burden on transportation across a longer distance compared to shorter distance; 
higher fuel prices cause the iceberg to melt quicker.  The implications of this are clear: when 
price of oil increases due to a shock, we expect trade to decrease with far away partners by a 
larger factor compared to nearby partners, effectively making trade more local.  This differs from 
conventional trade theory expectations; Anderson (2011) points out that any uniform percentage 
change in trade costs across all partners, such as a typical national change in oil price, would 
result in no change of value of trade.  Considering the heterogeneous effects over distance, 
general equilibrium effects of a common shock will have heterogeneous net effects dependent on 
ones composition of trade partners.   
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In this paper, we explore how trade flows within the United States are impacted by fuel 
prices across distance.  We use a structural gravity model of trade applied to U.S. inter-state 
trade across the years of 2002, 2007, and 2012.  Oil price effects are introduced in the form of 
regionally varying diesel fuel prices.  Our findings confirm that bilateral trade flow is 
significantly dampened by higher diesel prices, more so when the distance between trading 
partners is larger.  We also consider a spatial econometric model to directly incorporate spatial 
interdependence of trade flows, and we find consistent effects.  Then we consider a 10% 
nationwide price shock in a general equilibrium framework, where states are allowed to adjust 
output, expenditures, and resistance to trade across all partners.  Overall we find that trade within 
the U.S. becomes systematically more local as oil becomes more expensive.  This is exemplified 
in the case where trade from Massachusetts to California falls by 2.9% but only 0.47% to New 
York, a 2.43 percentage point difference.  Furthermore, trade actually increases within the 
borders of Massachusetts by 0.53%.  While trade is partially redistributed, the net effects yield a 
median welfare loss of 0.69 percent, in terms of real GDP, and net welfare loss for the nation. 
We contribute to the trade literature by showing that even within the U.S., where distance 
faced is much smaller than internationally, trade flows are still responsive to oil prices.  Having 
trade be so sensitive to a single, volatile, resource has policy implications of necessitating 
technological change in energy and transportation.  Regulations  on fuel economy and 
requirements to deploy vehicle upgrades are realistic examples.  Systematic revamping of 
transportation fleets towards electric only would be ideal.  The negative impact on trade and 
welfare should be considered in the cost-benefit analysis  when designing national oil tax policy 
and state fuel policy.  Aside from consequences, we demonstrate the mechanism in which a 
uniform shock creates non-zero effects in general equilibrium, contrary to trade theory and 
suggests functional form of trade costs is important.  A 10% shock can result in a national 
welfare loss of over $82 billion.  Our findings highlight the heterogeneous effects over space, 
which are necessary to consider in spatially blind policy such as a national oil tax.  Finally, we 
show the regional connectivity in the U.S. states by incorporating the regional border effects as a 
non-conventional trade cost in the gravity model of intranational trade. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II is an overview of the literature 
linking oil price to trade, a briefing of intra-national trade patterns in the U.S., and the  spatial 
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interdependence of flows.  Section III presents the methodology, including a theoretical model 
and empirical strategy.  Section IV introduces the data and presents the descriptive analysis. 
Section V reports the empirical results from the trade model.  Section VI presents the general 
equilibrium framework and findings. Section VII provide additional discussion and closing 
remarks. 
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II. Literature  
Trade costs are a main factor of interest in trade analysis  and are the obvious channel for 
oil price to influence trade. Trade costs, as described by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), are 
broadly defined as "all costs incurred in getting a good to a final user other than the marginal 
costs of the producing the good itself..."  and include policy barriers and transportation costs.  
The authors show that trade costs remain large despite globalization and trade liberalization, and 
they exist in both cross-border and within-border trade.  Most importantly, the very existence of 
trade costs has significant welfare implications.  Due to the unreliability and inconsistency of 
transportation cost estimates, distance is virtually always used in trade models as a proxy of 
transportation costs.  Distance remains a significant cost, notwithstanding technological 
advances, and continues to shape trade even for developed nations (Boulhol and de Serres, 
2010).  While distance has worked well so far, Head and Mayer (2014) discuss the need to 
further explore its role in a trade setting and reevaluate the functional form of transportation 
costs. Studies have attempted to improve on this, for example Combes and Lafourcade (2005) 
develop a methodology to incorporate factors such as infrastructure and energy into cost 
measures within France.  Such data may be difficult to procure may not be consistently measured 
across areas.  In his survey, Hummels (2007) unpacks transportation costs through exploring 
several difficult to acquire data sets containing various freight shipping rates.  He finds that fuel 
costs are central to determining freight costs.  For example a price spike for trip charters in 1970 
is attributed to oil price shock, as well as in 1957 after the Suez Canal Crisis.  Also, in the 1980’s 
a drop in ocean shipping rates corresponds to a fall in oil prices at the same time.  Given that oil 
prices and shipping costs are linked, it is important to relate shipping costs to trade.  Hummels, 
Lugovskyy, and Skiba (2009) investigate the effects of high shipping costs on trade by exploring  
market power induced transportation costs markups and its subsequent negative effect on trade 
with developing countries.  Most strikingly, eliminating such price markups would increase trade 
from  the United States to Latin America by 5.9%.    
Having established the underlying relationship between oil price and shipping costs, and 
subsequently shipping costs and trade, it is appropriate to look at studies directly relating oil 
prices to trade.  The few studies of oil price on trade all have the common theme of international 
setting and a global price.  First, a study by Brun et al. (2005) finds that when oil price is taken 
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into consideration as a trade cost, it resolves the distance puzzle that the elasticity of trade with 
respect to distance increases over time.  This highlights the importance of incorporating oil price 
in a trade model.  A paper by Vezina and von Below (2013) prioritizes exploring the effect of oil 
price on bilateral international trade using a formal structural gravity model with data starting at 
1962.  They interact oil price with distance in addition to the traditional distance variable, use 
common  international trade cost variables (Language, Regional Trade Agreement, Colony link, 
etc), include time specific exporter and importer fixed effects and find a significant effect.  They 
find negative coefficients for distance and interaction between oil price and distance.  In the 
international trade context they conclude that higher oil prices make trade less global but do not 
explore the consequences in general equilibrium.  Similarly, in examining the trade boosting 
effects of the euro currency union, Nanovsky (2015) includes an oil price distance interaction 
term within a formal gravity model of international trade yearly from 1952 to 2012.  Again, oil 
price effects on trade are greater across longer distance.  However, neither Vezina and von 
Below (2013) nor Nanovsky (2015) investigate the heterogeneous trade impact on trading 
partners resulting from the nonlinear impact of the oil price over distance. 
While there is evidence of an oil price trade relationship in international trade, the sub-
national setting has not yet been considered.  Working in a setting of interstate trade it is 
necessary to consider the subtle differences in dynamics compared to international trade.  There 
are of course no tariffs or quotas imposed on trade within the United States, and common 
international trade factors such as language and currency are not applicable.  This simplifies any 
international trade theory used.  Despite the illusion of openness of trade within a nation, certain 
biases may act just as trade costs/barriers when considering intra-national trade such as 
agglomeration, home market bias, or structural economic links. In our case, it is not only 
important to consider intra-state trade, but also important to differentiate trade which takes place 
between states within a region, from interstate trade.  While both can technically be consider 
inter-regional trade, throughout this paper regions will refer to blocs
1
 of states which share 
similar economic structure;
2
 inter-regional trade will refer to the latter. 
                                                             
1
Similar to Regional Trade Agreements in the international setting and international trade literature. 
2
Note: some literature defines a region as a state, in which case intra-regional trade corresponds to intra-state trade, 
and inter-regional trade is equivalent to inter-state trade. For clarity in this paper: a region will refer to a group of 
states (defined by BEA), and should not be confused with a region meaning only a state.   
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Trade patterns are well known to concentrate locally to a large degree, so much so that 
the phenomenon is referred to as a "border" effect" or "home bias." In the international setting
3
 
the diverting effect of crossing a national border has been traditionally modeled as a trade cost.  
Within a country, for example the U.S. states, borders are not apparent deterrents to trade.  Yet, 
many studies have shown that sub national borders negatively affect trade flows.  Starting with 
Wolf's (2000) paper investigating trade flows between the U.S. states using the Commodity Flow 
Survey in 1993, the concept of "home bias" is introduced to refer to large within state trade 
patterns.  He estimates a gravity model with a dummy variable indicating if the trade flow origin 
and destination are the same.  The results show that the state border effect is significant, and has 
a magnitude of 3, i.e. trade within state is three times as large as trade across borders, which is 
rather large.  Millimet and Osang (2007) later revisit the home bias effect and find it to be 
smaller but still significant.  Coughlin and Novy (2011) even claim that trade is so locally 
clustered, that state border effects are larger than international border effects.  Craft and Klein 
(2015) compare U.S. domestic trade in 1949 and 2007 confirm the home bias is persistent and 
we can see that it remains large in 2007.  Also using 2007 data, Yilmazkuday (2012) further 
confirms home bias across states and varieties of goods.   Moving outside the U.S. Kashiha et al 
(2016) find nontrivial border effects in the wine market of Europe, a free trade zone.  Anderson 
and Yotov (2010) and later Agnosteva et al. (2015) use Canadian inter-provincial trade flows to 
find province specific home bias.  In a general equilibrium, they find strong home bias across all 
provinces, with heterogeneity dependent on geographic size and remoteness. 
Border effects and sub national trade patterns can be in part explained  by industry 
structure and links, tied to firm location and agglomeration. Besides locating near and trading 
with large home markets demanding final goods,
4
 firms are influenced by intermediate trade and 
transportation costs as presented by Krugman and Venables (1995).  Similarly, Venables (1996)  
shows that vertically linked industries, with intensive use of intermediate inputs, usually locate 
closer to their input sources for cost effectiveness, resulting in agglomeration.  Alonso-Villar 
(2005) compares such models, concluding that agglomeration is related to trade of both final and 
intermediate goods.  Yilmazkuday (2010) empirically finds that intermediate inputs lead to 
                                                             
3
 See McCallum (1995) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).  The magnitude has been sometimes considered a 
puzzle.  
4 "Home market effect", see Krugman (1980). 
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systematic connections between agglomeration and trade.  While agglomeration implies the local 
nature of trade, the structural links are not limited to explaining within state trade.  In fact, the 
interstate trade has been increasing, yet most trades happen within structurally related regions.  
For instance, Hewings et al (1998) found that the Chicago region experiences a  "hallowing out" 
phenomenon in the last 30 years, i.e. a decrease in density of intermediate goods traded in the 
local economy.  However, a large degree of trade overlap occurred among the Midwest through 
intra-industry trade in a process of value chain of production towards final products (Munroe and 
Hewings,1999).  Parr et al (2002) propose moving past a divide of spatially constrained 
economic activity (agglomeration effects) and those spatially unconstrained to include partially 
constrained, multi-state areas such as the Midwest.  In an extensive analysis of the trade patterns 
among the U.S. states, Lee (2010) finds a consistent pattern of trade across space that holds over 
time.  A set of "trading zones," or tight geographic pattern, emerges based on similarity of trade 
inflows and outflows.  The author compares these areas to the eight "regions" of states defined 
by the BEA (on the basis of economic similarity) and there is an unsurprising similarity.  This 
motivates our use of the BEA regions as part of the border effects in our trade model. 
While border effects seem to imply bilateral trade happens more intensively in blocs of 
states, it is important to note that trade flows are spatially dependent on each other.  Spatial 
interdependence of flows arises from the feature that any geographic area used is repeated 
throughout several observations, and any change in one observation is likely to have implications 
on all other related ones.  LeSage and Pace (2008) point this out and discuss dependence based 
on common origin, common destination, and even origin-destination dependence.  Behrens et al 
(2012) discuss the issues of interdependence of trade flows.  They note that the theoretical 
structural gravity model famously used by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) necessitates 
accounting for multilateral effects (effects across all trading partners) and when interdependence 
is not accounted for estimates may be biased.  While general equilibrium recovery accounts for 
this, it is often neglected in applied work.  The authors suggest an interaction weight matrix 
based on population share and then a spatial lag of dependent variable to interlink trade flows 
with common destination.  Using their model, they find that estimated U.S.-Canada border effect 
is smaller than previously estimated.   
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III. Methodology 
i. Theory 
We analyze the oil price and distance relationship using a gravity model which is 
commonly used to describe trade flows between a given origin destination pair.  Structural 
gravity, which has become well respected in theory and proven empirically successful (Anderson 
2011)
5
, can be defined as: 
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Where Xij is the trade flow between origin (exporter) i and destination (importer) j, Yi is 
total output or the size of origin economy i, Yj is the total expenditure or size of destination 
economy j.  Furthermore, tij  is a set of vectors representing bilateral trade costs between the 
origin destination pair, and has traditionally contained a coefficient of interest with which to aid 
policymaking or perform counterfactual exercises.  Trade costs can be defined in several ways as 
long as the multiplicative form in (1) holds.   
Πi and Ρ j are “multilateral resistance” terms, specifically outward multilateral resistance 
and inward  multilateral resistance respectively.  Inward multilateral resistance can be interpreted 
as buyer’s incidence; and is equivalent to a markup for a bundle of goods importer j would pay in 
the global
6
 market (Anderson and Yotov, 2010).  The structural gravity form utilizes constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences and products variety different by origin, as in 
Armington (1969).  As Anderson and Yotov (2010) note, using a framework outside of the 
Armington assumption is possible but currently has some unexplored implications.  The CES 
structure will allow incorporation of trade flows in a process of general equilibrium calculation 
as represented in Section VI. 
                                                             
5 Originally Anderson (1979), then Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)  
6 Global referring to the system 
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ii. Empirical Application 
In order to distinguish the effect of oil price on trade flow between a given origin and 
destination, first, consider the structural gravity model in (1).  In this specification, i and j are 
origin state and destination state, respectively.  Spanning three time periods, years 2002, 2007, 
and 2012, the model will simply include time index t for every term.
7
  Next,    , the trade costs 
between i and j are approximated by observable variables often used in the literature, as well as 
the variable of interest in this study. 
      
   
                                                                       (4) 
In this case, lnDIST is the log distance between each i and j and is not changing over time index 
t.  The primary variable of interest is the interaction between lnDIST and lnDIESEL.  Rather than 
using the price of a barrel of oil (i.e WTI) which has no spatial heterogeneity, the diesel prices 
can proxy the price of oil as they have incredibly high correlation.  Taking the average of the 
prices of location i and j will result in a unique price index for each origin destination pair in 
each time period t.  Interacting this price index with lnDIST will add non-linearity.  That is, a 
change in fuel price lnDIESEL will increase the trade cost term lnDISTxlnDIESEL more as the 
distance increase.   It is common practice to include all hierarchical terms when using a 
polynomial term such as an interaction.  However, the theoretical motivation behind this study 
does not include the absolute effect of oil price on trade, but rather its relative effects across 
distance.  Since the diesel price is observed in both the origin and destination, then averaged for 
that particular flow, price itself is independent of distance.  Agents do not observe a higher price 
at longer distance, just a larger burden in terms of costs.  A price increase widens the cost burden 
by a greater degree at farther distance.  In this framework, the diesel price effect is through the 
distance price interaction channel, and justifies exclusion of a standalone lnDIESEL term.
8
 
Next is a set of 3 vectors containing dummy variables to proxy the "border" type of trade 
costs.  They capture the complex underlying structural effects that encourage spatially and partial 
spatially constrained economic interaction.  The NEIGHBOR variable is a dummy which takes 
                                                             
7
 Time index omitted for simplicity  
8
 See (Nelder 2010) for support on deviation from hierarchical interaction structure.  We also find the coefficient of 
lnRDiesel to be highly insignificant; excluded from further estimation to not effect point estimates.  Results are 
shown in Appendix table A5. 
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value of 1 when i and j are contiguous to each other, and 0 elsewhere.  The HOME variable is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when i=j meaning that the trade flow is intrastate, 
and 0 elsewhere. This variable captures the effect of a home bias or a state border effect. Both 
NEIGHBOR and HOME dummy variables have been shown to useful in gravity model 
estimation.  Our other variable of interest is REGION, a dummy variable which takes the value 
of 1 when i and j are in the same economic region, 0 when i=j and otherwise.  Much like the 
HOME variable, the REGION variable captures the bias a state has to trade with its regional 
“partners” due to structural similarity.  Each of the three dummy variables captures a different 
“hierarchy” of bias and are distinguishable from each other.  That is, if i is a neighbor of j, then j 
must be a neighbor of j.  Similarly, if i is a regional partner of j, then j must be a regional partner 
of j.  However, if i and j are neighbors, they do not necessarily have to be regional partners.    
The benefit of using dummy variables for the border trade costs is their exogeneity 
compared to various measurable characteristics that can be endogenous.  Most importantly, it 
allows a simple way to control for fundamental tendencies of sub-national trade.  Since such a 
large portion of trade is represented by either within-state, neighboring state, or regional state 
trade, which is over a relatively short distance, omitting dummy variable controls may 
overestimate the effect of distance on trade flows.   We use reported average distance for within 
state flows which avoids concerns associated with geometric calculation of distance noted by 
Head and Mayer (2002). 
Next, substitute trade costs (4) into the baseline gravity equation (1).   
                                                                        
                                                       (5) 
 The parameters η and θ represent origin and destination time fixed effects, respectively, 
which control for the unobserved (log of) multilateral resistance terms.  A critical factor in model 
specification is the inclusion of these directional fixed effects (importer and exporter specific) to 
control for multilateral resistance instead of a proxy such as a remoteness index, as proposed by 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and emphasized by Feenstra (2004).  The baseline 
econometric model (5) can be estimated using a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
with Ericker-White robust standard errors as suggested by Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2011) and 
 
 
11 
 
which has become the standard for gravity model estimation.  This estimator corrects issues of 
heteroskedasticity inherent in trade data, which may actually bias the coefficients, and also 
allows for utilization of zero-value trade flows, which contain useful information.  To correct for 
intra-group correlation, state pair clustering of standard errors is applied.  Each model 
specification will be tested across the baseline as well as samples with differing treatment of zero 
trade flows, as discussed in the data section.  The purpose of this is two-fold, to explore the 
implications of zero-trade in our data on inference, and as a robustness check.  
As a recent paper by Fally (2015) shows, the PPML estimation method with directional  
fixed effects fully satisfies the theoretical constraints of multilateral resistance, so we can 
confidently proceed with modeling levels of trade as a function of fixed effects to satisfy theory.  
This also holds when Y variables are omitted, and activity variables are absorbed into fixed 
effects.  We can expect the coefficient    to be negative, as suggested by theory and consistent 
with gravity trade literature.  Our variable of interest    is expected to be negative, which would 
imply that as the price of diesel increases, trade will decreases, and even more so for longer 
distances.  The coefficients on NEIGHBOR, HOME, and REGION are all expected to be 
positive, indicating larger trade flows within your own state, with your neighbors, and with 
regional partners compared to all other states and regions.  HOME is expected to have the largest 
magnitude, followed by NEIGHBOR, and finally REGION.  Finally, when used, Y or 
size/activity of origin and destination, will be positive. 
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IV. Data and Preliminary Analysis  
The primary source of data utilized in this study is the Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) 
published by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics and covers the years 2002, 2007, and 2012.  
The CFS spans 41 commodities classified at the two digit SCTG level and published data are 
available at different dimensions and aggregation levels.  Specifically we use total commodity 
flows between origin and destination for the 50 U.S. States and District of Columbia. Trade 
flows are reported by total value of shipment in current year $millions between any given origin 
state and destination state.  Considering aggregate trade flows (all commodities total) of each 
state trading with each other state including itself there are 51x51x3 = 7,803 observations of flow 
across three times periods
9
.  As with all trade data, there is the issue of zero trade flows or 
missing values.  For robustness checks, we will define three sample: one baseline in which all 
trade flows are included and two robustness samples to consider two types of missing trade.
10
 All 
trade data are reported in current dollars, so we use the US Consumer Price Index to adjust the 
trade data to 2012 dollars.  
Next, several variables are constructed to proxy trade costs.  Distance is calculated as an 
arc distance
11
 between centroids of each state.  For trade flows within a given state, average 
shipment distance in miles as reported by the CFS (at an aggregate level) is used, and further 
averaged over all time periods.  In constructing the price variable, diesel fuel price data is used 
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) which contains the average annual price 
across 8 geographic areas.
12
 The reported prices are nominal, so we adjust the prices using the 
US Consumer Price Index, using 2012 as the base year.  While global oil prices and U.S. WTI 
are very closely tied to diesel, there is still noticeable regional variation of price.  According to 
the EIA, the price of diesel is composed of: 24% taxes, 19% Distribution & Marketing, 16% 
Refining, and 41% crude oil.  This composition reflects in the spatial heterogeneity, including 
over time, of the price of diesel.  For example, states have different tax policies, not only rates 
                                                             
9
 CFS data may indirectly include international exports/imports.  This will not bias our model, due to the use of 
importer exporter specific fixed effects.  Wolf (2000) uses CFS data and attempts to account for this, and notes that 
results are robust.  See Appendix for further discussion. 
10
Three samples will be created.  The first will included only trade flows greater than 0, the second will include all 
reliable trade flows, and third will include all observations with missing observations representing 0 trade.  See 
Appendix for more detail. 
11
Vincenty (1975) equation 
12
 EIA PADD districts 
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but types.  Excise taxes, which remain quite constant over time, are per-unit, influence price 
differently than ad valorem taxes, which are magnified when base prices are high.  In the case of 
flow data, every observation will have two prices, one for the origin and one for destination.  The 
final price for a given flow is simply the average of price between origin and destination, 
resulting in a cross-sectional heterogeneity as well as variation over time.  As we see in Figure 1, 
showing the diesel price across regions in 2002, 2007 and 2012, real diesel price ($2012) does 
vary across space, but increases a noticeable amount over time. 
To represent size of a state’s economy, annual state level gross domestic product is used 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  Again, the GDP is deflated by the U.S. CPI with 
base year of 2012.  The BEA also classifies the United States into 8 regions based on geography 
and homogeneity of economic characteristics such as industrial composition and demographics.  
These definitions are used to created a “regional border” dummy variable and for any subsequent 
regional categorization.  In Table 1 are the descriptive statistics for the sample where all 
aggregate flows are included and in Table 2 for the sample in which the zero trade flows are 
dropped. 
 i.  Border Effects of Trade 
 In Table 3, represents the flow of trade between each region, as a proportion of all flows 
from a given region (Table A1 in Appendix show inflows).  The diagonal element shows volume 
of trade flows that remain within the regional “borders,” which clearly represents a very large 
share of total trade and demonstrates the importance of the regional linkages between economies.  
For example, 58% of trade originating in the Great Lakes remains in the region, while nearly 
65% of trade destined for the Great Lakes was provided by a state member of the same region.  
Furthermore, we can break down trade into that which remains within state borders, which goes 
to a regional trading partner (i.e. in a state’s region, excluding itself), and which goes to everyone 
else.  Figure 2 is a bar chart of the composition of each states’ outgoing trade flow (export)  
volumes, grouped together by their respective regions (Figure A1 in Appendix  shows imports). 
We see that aside from some variations, there is a generally consistent pattern among the states.  
About 40% of trade flows remain within the state that they originate from, and in the western 
part of the country this number becomes even greater.  Furthermore, 20-25% of trade flows are 
interstate, but importantly between states which share a common region composed of about five 
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states.    Those shares show that a remarkably large amount of trade from any given state is 
destined for a small fraction of states.  These findings are indicative of underlying agglomeration 
economies within states, as well as multi-state network effects, all of which serve as motivation 
to incorporate regional “border” effects in addition to state border effects and pursue a 
geographic “hierarchy.” 
 ii.  Spatial Autocorrelation 
Next, we test the spatial interdependence of U.S. intrastate trade, i.e.  the autocorrelation 
of trade flows.  Two different varieties of spatial weight matrix will be considered, the first uses 
a k nearest neighbor approach and is constructed for both the origin and destination, as presented 
by LeSage and Pace (2008).  That is, with an origin-centric ordering of our data,           
represents the k=4 nearest neighbors around origin i, and           represents the k=4 
nearest neighbors around destination j.  Both are row-standardized.  This type of weight scheme 
results in 4 neighbors for every trade flow observation, all equally weighted.  The second type of 
weight matrix used is an inverse distance matrix, and is also separate for origin and destination.  
Let the matrix D be a symmetric nxn matrix with the inverse distance between every i and j, with 
the diagonal being the internal distance of each observation i=j.  We can expand this to relate a 
trade flow to other potential trade flows based on the same origin or same destination.  Let 
         and       .  In order to ensure that a particular origin-destination flow is 
not a “neighbor” of itself the diagonal will be set to zeros in both matrices.  The final   
             and                .  These matrices will relate a particular origin-
destination flow to others which share the same origin (or destination), weighted by the distance 
between the common origin (or common destination) and all other destination (or all other 
origins)
13
.  Again, both are row standardized and each observation has (n-1), or 50 neighbors.   In 
addition the k-nearest neighbors and inverse distance matrix described earlier, we will also 
consider the interaction weight matrix proposed by Behrens et al (2012) which is based on 
population share of each geographic area.
14
   
                                                             
13
 Specifically, a trade flow from origin i to destination j will have a neighborhood of all flows with same i and all 
possible j (not equal to i), with higher weight placed on those flows which the distance between i and j is smaller. 
14
 Constructed as                  where S is nxn matrix of 1s and diag(L) is nxn diagonal matrix of 
population shares for each area. 
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Table 4 reports the Moran’s I statistic estimated for each of the three years in our sample.  
All of the estimates are significant and indicate positive autocorrelation trade flows with 
common origin or destination, suggesting destination and origin based dependence respectively.  
Furthermore, the statistics for the destination based weights are very similar to their respective 
origin counterparts.  The k4 weight matrix is also capturing a much more local effect, and 
Moran's I is slightly larger in magnitude than with distance based matrix which relates all States 
in the U.S. through trade flows sharing common point.  These weight matrices seem appropriate 
for the data and will be applied later in the paper. 
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V.  Results 
 i. Baseline 
 First, we begin with describing our baseline gravity results when estimating Equation (4).  
As discussed before, three different sub-samples are considered.  Column (1) in Table 5 
corresponds to the baseline model where all zero trade flows are omitted.  Column (2) uses the 
same specification but limits the sample to only include zero trade flows which are observed to 
be zero.
15
  Column (3) includes all possible origin-destination observations, and all missing trade 
is considered to be zero-trade.  Columns (4) – (6) estimate the respective models in (1) – (3) but 
omitting control variables Yi and Yj, which are absorbed by fixed effect terms. We notice that 
there is no concerning differences among the models in terms of coefficients or model fit.   
Moving on, columns (3) and (6) include a full Origin-Destination flow matrix and are the 
most desirable models.  Their coefficients do not differ at all, except for the intercept and fixed 
effects terms.  Most importantly, our variable of interest lnDISTxlnDIESEL is significant and 
negative, which indicates that an increase in diesel price, holding distance constant, decreases 
trade flow X.  Furthermore, the larger the distance, the same increase in diesel price will decrease 
trade flow X by a greater amount. Our coefficient on lnDIST is lower than usually estimated in 
gravity models (median of -0.89, mean of -0.93)
16
, however these are mostly estimated at 
international level where distance has a larger scale, and our interaction captures part of the 
distance effect
17
.  Comparing elasticity will be more useful. 
Using β1and β2 from Table 5, column (3) we can retrieve the elasticity of trade with 
respect to distance at any given price of diesel as shown in the left panel of Figure 3.  In the right 
panel of Figure 3 is the elasticity of trade with respect to price of diesel, at various distances.  
Interestingly, our elasticity with respect to distance is still lower than the average of -0.93.  Trade 
with respect to distance is relatively inelastic, and does not change much over a range of diesel 
price, but still demonstrates that distance has more “friction” at higher diesel prices.  Most 
importantly, the responsiveness of trade to diesel price is very elastic and increases sharply as 
                                                             
15 Observation is not flagged “S” 
16
 All references to literature coefficients are from a meta-analysis by Head and Mayer (2014). 
17
 When the interaction lnRDieselxlnDist is excluded, the coefficient on lnDist is -0.70 
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distance increases.  Simply put, trade between far away partners is more sensitive to diesel price 
fluctuations. 
 Our other three trade cost variable are all positive and of reasonable magnitudes.  First, 
HOME, is very consistent with structural gravity estimates from the literature (median of 1.55).  
It indicates that there is a bias for states to keep trade within their own borders, specifically 
increasing trade within state borders by a factor of 4.67
18
, everything else equal, which can be 
interpreted that state borders lower trade by 78%.  The NEIGHBOR coefficient, is close to the 
contiguity coefficients in the literature using structural gravity (median 0.52, mean 0.66), and 
suggests that states in fact have a tendency to trade more with states that they share a border.  
The final trade cost proxy, REGION is a unique one and is intended to capture the tendency of a 
state to trade with its regional partners.  The coefficient is positive and significant, despite 
NEIGHBOR also being present.  Often it is the case that regional partners are also neighbors, so 
both coefficients being significant effectively separate the hierarchical geographic effects.  We 
find that states have a regional partner trading bias with a factor of 1.36, everything else equal.  
This is equivalent to “regional borders” lowering trade by about 26%.  Our REGION dummy is 
comparative to RTA agreements at the international level, which on average has a similar 
coefficient in the structural gravity literature (mean 0.36).  The set of these 3 vectors of dummy 
variables and their coefficients give us confidence that our model is well behaved in a pure intra-
national setting, and that despite perfect free trade, there are still trade frictions present. 
 ii.  Robustness 
 Besides testing our model specification for various subsamples, we explore normalized 
dependent variables, as some important studies have used. The first is Z1, which is trade flow X 
divided by the GDP of both origin and destination, as used by Andrson and van Wincoop (2003).  
The second is Z2, which is trade flow X multiplied by total income (GDP) of all states, and 
divided by GDP of the associated Origin and Destination.  Anderson and Yotov (2010) refer to 
this form, when using true expenditure and output, as the natural dependent variable.  As 
discussed earlier, gravity model estimation can be thought of as relative, and normalization is 
irrelevant to interpretation as long as upon retrieval of MR terms, proper adjustment is made 
                                                             
18
 The ratio is calculated as exp(HOME). Can be considered as 367% higher trade within borders.  This is only 
considered a partial trade impact, for further discussion see (Head and Mayer, 2014). 
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based on dependent variable used.  In Table 6 we can see the results and see that all coefficients 
are significant and signs do not change.  While there is some difference in the coefficient for the 
interaction term and distance variable, we have no reason to not move forward with our baseline 
model.  In fact, Anderson and Yotov (2012) have discussed the normalization concern and also 
conclude there is no issue with estimator choice.  
 Next we address the limitation of homogenous treatment of transportation mode in the 
baseline model specification when aggregate trade flows are used.  In reality, composition of 
transportation mode use can differ across trade flows and transportation modes may have 
different sensitivity to oil price depending on fuel efficiency. An example is trucking, which is 
critical to the intranational trade capabilities of the United States: 73% of all trade value is 
moved by truck alone (Commodity Flow Survey).  In Table 7 we can see this displayed by the 
large amounts of registered trucks.  While trucks are heavily relied on, they have poor fuel 
efficiency, traveling only 3 miles for every gallon of diesel.  Such a fuel intensiveness results in 
fuel comprising 46 percent of overall operating costs.
19
  Furthermore, 39% of the total average 
marginal costs of trucking operations are attributed to fuel.
20
  On top of this, the United States is 
geographically very large, spanning 3,000 miles coast to coast, from  New York to California.  
This all results in major consumption of diesel fuel and vehicle miles traveled by trucks annually, 
as seen in Table 10.  We expect that trade moved by truck is extra sensitive to price and any 
price shock effects should be larger in magnitude than our coefficient of interest suggests.
 21
 
 Due to data limitations, the number of missing observations at the mode dimension is 
large and assuming they are true  zero trade flows becomes unpalatable.  However, since a 
majority of trade in the CFS is through truck we will consider our baseline model with sample of 
only truck observations as a robustness check for the sensitivity to mode.  In Table 8 we see that 
all 3 models have significant coefficients, with unchanged signs and not unusually different 
magnitudes.  As expected, the truck sample yields a larger lnRDieselxlnDist coefficient across 
                                                             
19
 Department of Transportation (2008) Impact of High Oil Prices on Freight Transportation 
20
 American Transportation Research Institute (2014) An Analysis of Operational Costs of Trucking 
21
 We may see substitution from fuel sensitive modes such as truck to less flexible but fuel efficient modes such as 
rail, at least across longer distance.  Ideally, multiple modes would be included in the model, allowing for 
heterogeneous effects across modes and to capture substitution (i.e. between truck and rail).  In this case, we would 
expect the coefficient for diesel distance interaction to be larger in magnitude for truck, and positive for rail (relative 
to truck). 
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all samples and captures a greater sensitivity to diesel price.  We can conclude that our baseline 
model is preferred due to more complete sample. 
 iii.  Spatial Robustness   
 At this point we will directly incorporate the spatial interdependence of flows through an 
SLX
22
 specification.  While there have been many spatial econometric advances in modeling 
flows, they are generally linear in nature or have unexplored implications, and there is no gold 
standard for trade models.  LeSage and Satici (2013) discuss the use of spatially lagged origin 
and destination characteristics to represent surrounding potential and introduce interdependence.  
This is reminiscent of our MR terms.  We will control for these trade diverting factors of other 
flows by including spatially weighted average neighborhood GDP at both the origin and 
destination.  Both k4 and inverse distance are tested.  We reintroduce traditional activity variable 
Y for completeness. The resulting model in equation (6) is an SLX variety of baseline and has 
the benefit of estimator flexibility, compared to other spatial econometric models.  We can thus 
estimate with PPML for direct comparison to our baseline and properly
23
 account for 
heteroskedasticity and zero trade. 
                                                                           
                                                                     (6) 
 The estimated parameters   and   are considered local spillovers, but are mainly 
intended to be control variables and may very well be insignificant (similar to fixed effects).  
Kelejian et al (2011) include similar variables, using a weighting scheme analogous to our 
inverse distance matrix.  They describe the origin lag, in our case     , as market potential of 
other trade partners (sellers) on the supply side.  Similarly, the destination lag,     , is market 
potential of demand (other buyers).  While our autocorrelation of trade volume was shown to be 
positive, when we apply our inverse distance weight matrix to GDP we are introducing 
competition and expect the coefficient to be negative (or insignificant).  That is, controlling for 
bilateral size, a larger relative neighborhood should divert and lower trade flows.  In the case of 
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 Spatial lag of independent variables 
23
 We include OLS estimates for comparison.  Requires natural log transformation of dependent variable plus 
constant of 1 to include zero trade.  A dummy equal to 1 for zero trade observations is included to improve fit. 
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k4 weights, the neighborhood is small, averaging the GDP of only 4 nearest states, and not 
discounting by distance, thus expectations are not so clear.
24
 
 In Table 9 the results of both conventional model and SLX model are shown, using both 
estimation methods.  First, and most importantly, we notice that parameter estimates to not 
change at all for our variable of interest when considering the PPML estimator.  Second, we 
confirm the findings of Silva and Tenreyro (2006) that OLS estimation results in biased 
estimates, specifically the effect of lnDist, The F-test for a null hypothesis that the estimates are 
equal in the two models results in a    value of  5.84 (1 d.o.f.) and a p-value of  0.0156.  This 
demonstrates that linear spatial econometric models are not comparable with our conventional 
specification.  Looking closer at the estimates, the point estimates for the coefficients for 
spillover variables with k4 weights are positive but insignificantly different from zero, which 
confirms our concerns over using a small neighborhood.  When the inverse distance matrix is 
used, the coefficients look more appropriate.  Point estimates for both coefficients are negative 
and similar, but only destination spillovers are significant.  Kelejian et al (2011) find similar 
results, even when they include a spatial error (SER) component.   
 The spatial model results show us that even when incorporating forms of interdependence 
directly into estimation, our results are virtually unchanged, especially our coefficient of interest.   
Next, we will move forward with our baseline model, and utilize its structure to incorporate 
interdependence in a counterfactual exercise. 
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 Model with k4 weighted variable may capture agglomeration effects: if your immediate neighbors are 
larger/active, then more trade may be attracted to your multistate region in the first place.  If so, the effect on the 
coefficient would be in opposite direction of competition effects.   
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VI.  Counterfactual 
 Given the oil price and distance relationship found in the baseline model, we will 
consider the effects of a price shock on trade patterns using a counterfactual experiment.  
Conceptually, the rising cost of  transportation will be passed on to consumers of transportation 
services, such as trucking, through surcharges to save profit margins.  In an Armington world, 
consumers will need to reallocated their bundle of goods, given their budget constraint, to 
account for higher transportation costs.  We can expect consumers to purchase goods closer to 
them, where the transportation costs are not as high, to get close to their previous utility.  
However, goods from different origins are imperfect substitutes.  The changes to the reallocation 
of trade patterns will then result in welfare loss.  
i.  Partial Trade Impact 
 First, we will consider a comparative static situation where diesel price increases by 10% 
nationwide and its effect on all trade flows, everything else equal.  This is achieved through a 
simple prediction given 10% higher diesel price in the last year of our sample, holding 
everything else equal.  The effect is referred to as a partial trade impact (PTI) and does not 
account for changes in multilateral resistance terms or feedback driven output changes.  Such a 
shock to prices will lower trade between all state pairs; however it will have a larger effect on 
partners which are farther away.  We pick one state, Massachusetts
25
, as the origin and consider 
all other states as destinations to showcase our results in Figure 4.  We can see that 
Massachusetts will trade less with all states, but to a higher degree farther away.  For example, 
trade from Massachusetts to New York falls by about 3.4 percent, while trade to California falls 
by 5.7 percent.  That is quite a noticeable difference of 2.3 percentage points given such a 
modest price increase of only 10 percent.  Similar effects will be felt throughout the nation, with 
each state’s sphere of influence effectively shrinking and trade become more local by proportion.  
One implication is that the trade composition will become relatively more regional.  If we 
consider the same effect on trade flows, and then aggregate all trade by member region we have 
a snapshot of trade impact at the regional level in Appendix Table A2. 
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Massachusetts is selected since it has strong trade flows with New York and California, two similarly sized and 
important economies which are on opposite ends of geographic spectrum.   
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 ii.  General Equilibrium Trade Impact Framework 
 While a partial trade impact provides useful information, it is only considering the partial 
equilibrium effects and not the full interdependence of all trade flows, multilateral effects, or 
feedback from changes in size.  Since multilateral resistance contain our observable trade costs, 
any shocks to cost variables will change each states inward and outward multilateral resistance 
(IMR and OMR, respectively), and subsequently trade flows.  Head and Mayer call this trade 
impact as the modular trade impact (MTI) referring to Anderson’s (2011) discussion of 
modularity, in which trade flows distribution occurs in a different “module” than determinants of 
output (and expenditure).  Taking this framework one step further, by including adjustment in 
expenditures and output, we can capture the general equilibrium trade impact (GETI). 
         
   
 
   
          
               
   
   
    
  
   
    
  
   
 
    
     (7) 
GETI will be a ratio of trade X between counterfactual scenario and the baseline, easily 
convertible to percentage change. Fally (2015) shows that structural gravity estimation with 
PPML yields fixed effects estimates completely consistent with multilateral resistance equations 
(2) and (3).  From our set of equations (1)-(3) we can recover both outward and inward 
multilateral resistance terms in the following way: 
    
                          (8) 
       
     
  
   
                (9) 
The trade flow vector X between each origin and destination is used to construct output    
     and expenditure         .  Yj0 is the total expenditure of a destination which is chosen to 
be the reference importer and is used for normalization. Finally, η and θ are the estimated 
coefficients on origin and destination fixed effects, respectively.  In a panel setting, multilateral 
resistance will vary by year, and there will be one reference importer for each year. 
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Next, we follow Anderson, Yotov, and Larch (2015)
26
, and estimate the general 
equilibrium through three general steps utilizing the properties of PPML and structural form of 
gravity. First, our baseline model is estimated with a further reduced form of (5) where there is 
no intercept and GDP terms are dropped:  
                                                                        
                                         (10) 
One importer fixed effect is dropped for each year and is consistent with chosen reference 
importer.
27
 Then, predicted values of X are computed to use as the baseline data to avoid 
capturing model error as part of trade impacts.  At this point we can retrieve baseline MR terms 
using (8) and (9) above.  Second, we define our counterfactual trade cost, a nationwide 10% 
increase in diesel prices in the last time period of our sample, Then equation (10) is estimated 
again on the original data X, while constraining all bilateral trade cost coefficients.  This will 
estimate a new set of coefficients for the fixed effects, and again MR terms can be computed.  
Third, we allow for endogenous adjustments to values of output and expenditure in an 
endowment economy.  This happens through changes in factory gate prices in (11) caused by 
changes in the previous step. 
        
  
 
   
    
      (11) 
The price    is the supply price and   is a distribution parameter of CES utility function.
28
  Once 
a new set of output and expenditure is found, and subsequent changes in trade data X, the second 
step is repeated to find new MR terms.  Again, step 3 needs to be repeated to retrieve new output 
and expenditure.  Multiple feedbacks take place until market clears and price does not change.  
Finally, the welfare effect, which is the loss of income or real GDP, is defined below in (12) and 
consistent with that presented by Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012). 
   
  
    
  
      
      (12)  
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 Thanks to Anderson, Yotov, and Larch for providing their code as a supplement.  Special thanks to Yoto Yotov 
for his helpful comments.  We base our estimation on their procedure, while also adjusting to a panel setting.  Any 
errors are our own. 
27
 We choose Illinois; this is irrelevant in final GETI results. 
28
 Of course, equation (11) is technically time specific.  However, since we only estimate a change in the last time 
period, t-1 is not effected at all so the generic price equation is sufficient for presentation. 
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 iii.  GETI Results 
 The general equilibrium results of the 10% price shock show a more realistic picture of 
the trade impact, including non-obvious distributional effects.  Here, general equilibrium 
considers multilateral and feedback effects, and the same shock results in more heterogeneous 
(Figure 5) compared to the PTI (Figure 4).  For example, we do not see a uniform “wave” pattern 
anymore and states such as Illinois and Georgia lose more trade from Massachusetts than 
expected, compared to states of similar distance.  This is because a state is able to adjust imports 
and exports in response to changes in multilateral cost, which changes both their own and other 
states' output and expenditure, and then feeds back into adjusting trade volumes.  Furthermore, 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) have emphasized that trade effects in general equilibrium 
tend to be smaller overall and this holds true in our case.  Exemplified by the same trade flows as 
before, trade from Massachusetts to New York only falls by 0.47 percent and falls by 2.91 
percent to California.  The effects are smaller than PTI, but the gap, now a 2.43 percentage point 
difference, is actually larger.  Interestingly, Massachusetts trades less with every partner, but 
actually increases trade within its own borders by 0.53 percent.  These effects can only be 
discovered in general equilibrium, as heterogeneity arises from the composition of each state’s 
trade partners and interdependence through substitution. 
 In the general equilibrium, the pattern of diesel price effects on trade across space is still 
present despite heterogeneity and feedback effects.  Anderson (2011) discusses the offsetting 
feedback of multilateral resistance in the theoretical structural gravity model so it is expected that 
the same percentage shock to trade costs across all partners will result in no net change of trade 
volumes.  However, our results show that trade volumes have a net change, both at flow and state 
level.  The overall trend of trade falling more across distance is displayed in Figure 6, in a plot of 
percentage change in trade compared to lnDist for each individual trade flow.   Some trade 
volumes do increase as the lower end of distance distribution, which can be attributed to the 
substitution of trade with local options.  Most often this occurs by states trading more within 
their own borders, as seen in Table A3 of Appendix, where every state, besides California and 
Texas, has increased home trade.  Having aggregated trade flows to the state level, we see a net 
decrease for imports and exports across all states.  When we aggregate to inter-regional flows, 
percentage changes shown in Table A4 of Appendix, we see a clear effect present along the 
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diagonal indicating smaller trade loss with a region compared to out of region.  In three areas, 
New England, Plains, and Mountain, trade within the region even manages to grow. 
 Given the net effects of a state's trade flows on output and expenditure, we compute the 
welfare effects in terms of income or real GDP.  We find that each state suffers a welfare loss 
from the price shock, with the median effect being 0.69% income lost.  The welfare effects are 
not uniform, ranging from 0.55% in states like Connecticut and Rhode Island, to 0.97% in 
Alaska.  Finally, we convert the percentage change in income for every state into (2012) dollars, 
and aggregate to find a national effect of $82 billion in lost income.  While this is only a small 
fraction of the U.S. real GDP, it is noticeable considering annual GDP growth rates and having 
resulted from such a modest price shock.  
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VII.  Conclusion 
 i.  Discussion 
 The baseline model specification used in this study is robust across samples and 
specification, even incorporating spatial interdependence.  However, it is important to remember 
that the effects found are truly average effects, which are marginal and by design interacted with 
distance.  To be clear, using an aggregate trade flow model and general equilibrium trade impact 
in an endowment setting will create heterogeneity only resulting from each states trading partner 
composition and related multilateral costs.  Since the oil price effect is related to distance, each 
state will be affected differently depending on distance to all of their own trading partners (and 
technically the regional diesel price) as well as each of their partners' composition of trade 
partners and associated costs.   
 However, our model does not account for sources of heterogeneity, such as potential 
differences in the effect of diesel price distance interaction across trade flows.  It may very well 
be the case that certain trade partners are more stable and unresponsive to price shocks due to 
factors besides distance, such as industry links, commodity/sector composition, specialization, or 
other features of establishment production structures.  A clear direction to incorporate these 
factors would be use of  disaggregated data, for example at commodity level, and estimate 
separate models for each sector.  This would allow for different estimates of diesel price-distance 
interaction coefficient, and even different elasticity of substitution across sectors.  Another 
dimension is that of transportation mode availability, choice, and substitution.  As discussed 
before, there may be different magnitudes of price effects among different modes, and 
substitution between them can take place.  The implication is that areas or trade corridors that 
rely heavily on a specific mode will be affected by shocks differently, and areas that can switch 
between modes may not have to substitute between partners to such a degree.  Data issues are the 
primary restriction to incorporating either commodity or transportation mode disaggregation.  
Computational issues also arise, specifically consistent aggregation across specific models and 
large number of fixed effects compared to observations in short panels. 
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 Oil price effects have been shown
29
 to have non-linear macro effects, primarily differing 
based the sign of the shock, i.e. positive or negative.   We cannot incorporate seperate positive 
and negative oil price shocks in our model since the diesel price is always increasing over time in 
our data.  Hence, in the case of non-linearity our effect is associated with a positive shock, and 
negative shocks would have different magnitude in addition to opposite sign.  There may also be 
non-linear scale effects which we cannot explore due to the short length of our panel (and 
observed diesel prices) and frequency of waves
30
.  These are of course questions best suited for 
time series analysis and require consistent historical data.  All in all, our simulated 10% shock is 
positive and small, and it continues a trend observed in the data; thus, it can be used with 
comfort. 
 ii.  Closing Remarks 
 We apply a structural gravity model to trade flows within the United States and focus on 
the interaction of diesel price with distance as a trade cost.  In a setting of inter-state and inter-
regional trade, we see that overall the effects of diesel price increase with magnitude across 
distance.  Our results are robust, notably through a spatial econometric specification used to 
account for interdependence of trade flows directly.  In a general equilibrium, to account for 
multilateral and feedback effects, we see the pattern remains, and a 10% price shock makes trade 
relatively more local and results in a net loss of welfare for the nation. 
 Our finding show that U.S. reliance on oil has welfare effects through trade disruptions, 
and the 10% shock results in over $82 billion in lost income.  The model we use demonstrates 
that a uniform national price shock has net effects.  Not only is there a trade loss, the effects are 
heterogeneous.  These consequences need to be considered in the design of spatially blind 
national oil tax policy and state fuel taxes.  Furthermore, obvious policy implications include 
technological progress towards alternate energy sources in transportation to curb reliance on oil 
and sensitivity to fluctuations.   
 It would be interesting to investigate the oil price effect on trade in other intranational 
settings.  Perhaps the U.S. is sensitive to oil prices simply due to its large geography and reliance 
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 For example, see Hamilton (2011) 
30
 A drawback to having more frequent waves would be time autocorrelation and considering lagged effects of oil 
price, otherwise non issues in a 5 year period. 
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on trucking, and the relationship is different across countries.  Furthermore, linking interstate 
trade with international trade would increase the domain of distance and potentially strengthen 
the effect and magnify heterogeneity.  Local and regional trade may prove to be relatively even 
more important.  Deeper exploration of transportation modes should prove insightful and 
strengthen the case for technological change.  Our findings should motivate further studies 
overlapping energy and fields such as trade, since the energy problem will not be going away 
soon and oil prices are more volatile than ever. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1 Diesel Price 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics- All Flows 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Xij (Trade $m) 7803 4720.69 30157.91 0.00 1432562.00 
lnDist 7803 6.82 0.90 1.30 8.57 
lnRDiesel 7803 1.03 0.36 0.49 1.44 
lnYi 7803 12.08 1.03 10.11 14.59 
lnYj 7803 12.08 1.03 10.11 14.59 
Home 7803 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Region 7803 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Neighbor 7803 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics- Flows>0 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Xij (Trade $m) 6645 5543.35 32610.69 1.00 1432562.00 
lnDist 6645 6.72 0.88 1.30 8.57 
lnRDiesel 6645 1.04 0.36 0.49 1.44 
lnYi 6645 12.18 1.03 10.11 14.59 
lnYj 6645 12.18 1.02 10.11 14.59 
Home 6645 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Region 6645 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Neighbor 6645 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
 
Table 3 Percentage of Region Outflows 
    
Origin 
    Destination Far West Lakes Mideast NewEng Plains Mountain Southeast Southwest 
Far West 70.46 3.61 4.34 4.11 5.90 14.19 3.54 4.15 
Lakes 4.58 58.50 8.86 5.01 14.01 5.70 9.18 3.34 
Mideast 4.50 8.15 61.76 16.49 4.65 4.20 7.26 2.47 
NewEng 1.19 1.53 5.69 62.02 1.05 0.92 1.18 0.53 
Plains 1.92 7.29 2.23 1.54 53.29 6.13 2.67 2.84 
Mountain 4.25 1.50 0.82 0.56 2.25 53.52 0.79 1.44 
Southeast 6.20 13.84 12.66 7.07 10.78 6.99 68.28 8.15 
Southwest 6.90 5.57 3.64 3.19 8.07 8.35 7.11 77.07 
Total
31
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
                                                             
31 Trade to and from Alaska and Hawaii are not shown as they are not defined in any region. 
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Figure 2 Export Composition 
 
Table 4 Moran's I of Trade Flow Xij 
Weight 2002 2007 2012 
Population Share .0633 (.001) .0463 (.001) .0331 (.001) 
Destination: k4 .0807 (.001) .0636 (.002) .0511 (.005) 
Origin: k4 .0826 (.003) .0561 (.007) .0442 (.007) 
Destination: Distance .0369 (.001) .0303 (.003) .0225 (.004) 
Origin: Distance .0394 (.001) .0284 (.001) .0214 (.005) 
P-values with 999 permutations in parenthesis 
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Table 5 Baseline Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML 
VARIABLES X>0 X≠S X>=0 X>0 X≠S X>=0 
       
lnDieselxlnDist -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.078*** -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.078*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
lnDist -0.558*** -0.559*** -0.608*** -0.558*** -0.559*** -0.608*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
lnYi 0.567*** 0.614*** 0.848***    
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)    
lnYj 1.577*** 1.564*** 0.795***    
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.06)    
Home 1.638*** 1.634*** 1.540*** 1.638*** 1.634*** 1.540*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) 
Region 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.306*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.306*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Neighbor 0.599*** 0.597*** 0.573*** 0.599*** 0.597*** 0.573*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant -16.057*** -16.404*** -8.235*** 9.936*** 7.091*** 9.279*** 
 (1.75) (1.80) (1.42) (0.56) (0.51) (1.17) 
       
Observations 6,645 6,696 7,803 6,645 6,696 7,803 
FEit YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fejt YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LL -2.355e+06 -2.360e+06 -2.827e+06 -2.355e+06 -2.360e+06 -2.827e+06 
Robust standard errors (clustered by State pair)  
in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Figure 3 Distance and Price Elasticity 
 
Table 6 Robustness-Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML 
VARIABLES Z1>0 Z1≠S Z1>=0 Z2>0 Z2≠S Z2>=0 
       
lnDieselxlnDist -0.071*** -0.070*** -0.053*** -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.045*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
lnDist -0.831*** -0.849*** -1.041*** -0.785*** -0.801*** -0.949*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Home 1.737*** 1.696*** 1.368*** 1.864*** 1.830*** 1.611*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) 
Region 0.318*** 0.314*** 0.309*** 0.333*** 0.329*** 0.335*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Neighbor 0.626*** 0.614*** 0.546*** 0.657*** 0.647*** 0.608*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Constant -9.604*** -13.722*** -8.381*** 6.487*** 2.420*** 7.367*** 
 (0.39) (0.43) (0.43) (0.40) (0.42) (0.45) 
       
Observations 6,645 6,696 7,803 6,645 6,696 7,803 
FEit YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FEjt YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LL -0.00997 -0.00997 -0.0100 -5486 -5494 -5836 
Z1=X/(YiYj), Z2=(X*ΣYi)/(YiYj) 
Robust standard errors (clustered by State pair) in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 7 Robustness- Truck Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 PPML PPML PPML 
VARIABLES X>0 X≠S X>=0 
    
lnRDieselxlnDist -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.088*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
lnDist -0.618*** -0.641*** -0.703*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Home 1.718*** 1.664*** 1.568*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Region 0.357*** 0.357*** 0.365*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Neighbor 0.681*** 0.662*** 0.641*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 9.764*** 10.862*** 9.388*** 
 (0.18) (0.37) (1.12) 
Observations 5,938 6,470 7,803 
FEit YES YES YES 
FEjt YES YES YES 
LL -1.783e+06 -1.839e+06 -2.269e+06 
Robust standard errors (clustered by State pair) in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
Table 8 DOT Statistics 
 2002 2007 2012 
Registered Trucks  2,277,000 2,635,000 2,469,000 
Diesel Consumed by Trucks (millions gallons) 26,480 30,904 27,975 
Vehicle miles Traveled (millions) 138,737 184,199 163,602 
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Table 9 Spatial Model Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS OLS PPML PPML PPML 
VARIABLES Ln(X+1) Ln(X+1) Ln(X+1) X X X 
       
lnYi 1.044*** 0.944*** 1.132*** 0.848*** 0.797*** 0.841*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) 
(Wo)lnYi  0.085 -0.279  0.040 -0.685 
  (0.05) (0.21)  (0.18) (0.47) 
lnYj 0.909*** 0.812*** 0.920*** 0.795*** 0.600*** 0.860*** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) 
(Wd)lnYj  -0.001 -0.908***  0.063 -0.735** 
  (0.08) (0.18)  (0.14) (0.27) 
lnDist -0.744*** -0.744*** -0.744*** -0.608*** -0.608*** -0.608*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
lnDieselxlnDist -0.076** -0.076** -0.076** -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.078*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Home 2.002*** 2.002*** 2.002*** 1.540*** 1.540*** 1.540*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Region 0.414*** 0.414*** 0.414*** 0.306*** 0.306*** 0.306*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Neighbor 0.762*** 0.762*** 0.762*** 0.573*** 0.573*** 0.573*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
zero -4.433*** -4.433*** -4.433***    
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)    
Constant -11.090*** -9.833*** 1.751 -8.235*** -5.899 7.998 
 (0.74) (1.22) (3.90) (1.42) (3.85) (9.80) 
Weights - K4 DIST - K4 DIST 
R-squared 0.932 0.932 0.932 0.991 0.991 0.991 
Observations 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803 7,803 
FEit YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FEjt YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LL -9173 -9173 -9173 -2.827e+06 -2.827e+06 -2.827e+06 
Robust standard errors (clustered by origin destination pair
32
) in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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 For model 6, we also check clustering by Origin, in which case the origin lag of GDP is significant (p=.000) and 
destination lag of GDP is barely significant (p=.049) and by Destination, in which case origin lag of GDP is 
insignificant (p=.204) and destination lag of GDP is significant (p=.000).  Ultimately, these are control variables so 
robustness in terms of significance is not priority. 
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Figure 4 Partial Trade Impact 10% Increase (Massachusetts Origin) 
 
Figure 5 GETI 10% Increase (Massachusetts Origin) 
 
Figure 6 %Change of Trade Flow From 10% Increase in Price 
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Appendix 
CFS data comes in various dimensions of disaggregation, including commodity and 
transportation mode.  There are 41 commodity classifications based on SCTG.  For 
transportation mode, there are various levels of detail but in general there are 6 different single 
mode types and 1 multiple mode category.  Published tables we use necessitate  2 dimensions: 
origin and destination in order to create a flow matrix.  As the dimensions increase, and level of 
disaggregation increases, publication standards for certain observations may not be met and are 
censored, resulting in missing value and labeled "S".  The other type of missing observation  is 
resulting from observations not reported or smaller in magnitude than 1 reportable unit, and can 
be safely assumed to be zero trade flows.  As the level of aggregation increases, losing certain 
dimensions such as mode or commodity type, information which would not be published before 
is now included in the aggregate calculations.   For the aggregate data, there are 1,158 zero trade 
flows (14.84% of sample), 1,107 (14.19%) of which are of the second case (censored).  These 
are still reasonable numbers to use.  However, disaggregated by origin, destination, and then 
commodity yields unsettling numbers, and some vary greatly by year. 
 Instead of disaggregating by commodity, if the origin, destination, and transportation 
mode dimensions are used similar problems arise.  While the truck transportation mode is still 
useable, it is also the most widespread mode by far.  Even incorporating railroad introduces 
concerning "S" observations, which may be un-reportable due to market concentration in 
particular trade corridor.  Furthermore, if transportation mode is used instead of fully aggregate 
trade flows, then composition of actual products in each trade flow will matter much more for 
each mode.  While the origin, destination, mode, and commodity dimensions data is available, 
the zero observations issue is magnified even more.   
 An additional limitation of the data is the tracking of imports/exports.  Respondents to the 
survey are not required to exclude these from reporting, and a shipment which originally came 
from Canada may "originate" in Michigan, and then go to Ohio for example.  This is a known 
issue, but not much can be done until more waves of micro-data are released.  The issue of 
recording exporter (or importer) compared to actual production (or consumption) location is a 
known one in international trade.  Head and Mayer (2014) note this, referencing the large 
amount of trade flows going through Antwerp, Belgium relative to its GDP.  They do conclude 
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that fixed effects have the advantage of controlling for these effects, correcting for systematic 
overstating of trade.  However, when considering counterfactual figures some caution is needed.  
Additional Tables and Figures 
Table A1 Percentage of Region Inflows 
    
Destination 
  
                
Origin Far West Lakes Mideast NewEng Plains Mountain Southeast Southwest 
Far West 72.73 3.85 4.79 3.67 3.60 20.13 3.80 5.50 
Lakes 4.91 64.91 11.45 6.26 18.04 9.38 11.18 5.86 
Mideast 4.01 6.68 58.92 15.77 3.75 3.47 6.95 2.59 
New Eng 1.42 1.41 5.87 64.19 0.97 0.89 1.45 0.85 
Plains 3.50 6.77 2.85 1.87 57.44 6.11 3.79 3.70 
Mountain 2.67 0.88 0.82 0.52 2.10 46.21 0.78 1.21 
Southeast 5.79 12.24 12.25 5.80 7.93 5.90 66.26 8.98 
Southwest 4.98 3.27 3.06 1.92 6.18 7.92 5.79 71.31 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Figure A1 Import Composition 
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Table A2 Partial Trade Impact 10% Increase - Regional Changes 
    Origin     
Destination Far West Lakes Mideast New Eng Plains Mountain Southeast Southwest 
Far West 
-3.48 -5.42 -5.61 -5.66 -5.21 -4.69 -5.49 -4.96 
Lakes 
-5.43 -3.17 -4.51 -4.78 -4.45 -5.12 -4.55 -5.02 
Mideast -5.62 -4.55 -2.98 -3.29 -5.05 -5.40 -4.34 -5.29 
New England -5.67 -4.81 -3.46 -2.70 -5.16 -5.46 -4.85 -5.39 
Plains 
-5.21 -4.41 -5.05 -5.15 -3.27 -4.66 -4.79 -4.66 
Mountain -4.73 -5.12 -5.40 -5.47 -4.68 -3.11 -5.26 -4.75 
Southeast 
-5.48 -4.61 -4.35 -4.86 -4.84 -5.26 -3.46 -4.80 
Southwest -4.90 -5.01 -5.29 -5.39 -4.68 -4.69 -4.82 -3.31 
 
Table A3 State Level GETI Indices (Percentage Change) 
State Trade Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Welfare 
 
Home Regional Regional Else Else Total Total Total 
AL 0.67 -0.67 -0.74 -1.57 -1.55 -1.08 -1.13 -0.69 
AK 1.66 -1.06 -1.56 -2.15 -1.59 -2.13 -1.59 -0.97 
AZ 0.82 -1.33 -1.35 -1.62 -1.25 -1.56 -1.26 -0.69 
AR 0.99 -0.76 -0.76 -1.15 -1.08 -1.00 -0.96 -0.76 
CA -0.17 -1.10 -1.61 -1.77 -2.16 -1.66 -2.08 -0.65 
CO 0.76 -0.49 -0.69 -1.47 -1.45 -1.36 -1.38 -0.70 
CT 0.41 -0.59 -0.71 -1.04 -1.23 -0.97 -1.15 -0.55 
DE 1.36 -0.34 -0.27 -1.27 -1.28 -0.84 -0.81 -0.69 
DC 2.73 -0.53 -0.15 -1.33 -0.96 -1.04 -0.68 -0.70 
FL 0.32 -1.83 -1.12 -2.39 -1.68 -2.16 -1.45 -0.64 
GA 0.44 -0.87 -0.90 -1.78 -1.75 -1.28 -1.30 -0.64 
HI 1.37 -1.56 -1.06 -2.95 -1.89 -2.92 -1.88 -0.74 
ID 1.37 -0.18 -0.34 -1.33 -1.17 -1.13 -1.06 -0.83 
IL 0.14 -0.96 -1.15 -1.35 -1.76 -1.24 -1.56 -0.58 
IN 0.45 -0.89 -0.82 -1.34 -1.57 -1.16 -1.22 -0.62 
IA 0.72 -0.66 -0.71 -1.32 -1.41 -1.16 -1.23 -0.69 
KS 0.64 -0.68 -0.69 -1.25 -1.44 -1.14 -1.27 -0.71 
KY 0.62 -0.72 -0.88 -1.25 -1.31 -1.04 -1.15 -0.66 
LA 0.52 -1.17 -0.99 -1.71 -1.51 -1.52 -1.33 -0.64 
ME 1.36 -0.28 -0.25 -1.46 -1.24 -1.22 -1.05 -0.78 
MD 0.60 -1.10 -0.78 -1.07 -1.02 -1.08 -0.95 -0.57 
MA 0.53 -0.65 -0.61 -1.51 -1.50 -1.35 -1.31 -0.58 
MI 0.34 -0.88 -0.76 -1.61 -1.79 -1.33 -1.31 -0.64 
MN 0.51 -0.74 -0.99 -1.54 -1.82 -1.37 -1.63 -0.65 
MS 0.86 -0.62 -0.58 -1.51 -1.38 -1.04 -0.97 -0.72 
MO 0.62 -0.86 -0.77 -1.27 -1.25 -1.20 -1.16 -0.67 
MT 1.31 -0.43 -0.06 -1.55 -1.01 -1.41 -0.90 -0.84 
NE 0.94 -0.51 -0.51 -1.28 -1.45 -1.07 -1.16 -0.75 
NV 1.29 -0.93 -0.62 -1.43 -1.41 -1.23 -1.05 -0.78 
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Table A3 (Cont.) 
State Trade Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Welfare 
 
Home Regional Regional Else Else Total Total Total 
NH 1.29 -0.19 -0.15 -1.47 -1.28 -1.13 -0.99 -0.72 
NJ 0.35 -0.66 -1.02 -1.59 -1.87 -1.18 -1.54 -0.56 
NM 1.48 -0.66 -0.62 -1.29 -0.98 -1.02 -0.85 -0.84 
NY 0.17 -1.28 -0.87 -1.36 -1.12 -1.34 -1.05 -0.56 
NC 0.43 -0.74 -0.98 -1.48 -1.62 -1.12 -1.32 -0.67 
ND 1.30 -0.63 -0.35 -1.33 -1.29 -1.17 -1.00 -0.82 
OH 0.28 -1.03 -0.99 -1.38 -1.58 -1.28 -1.37 -0.63 
OK 0.86 -0.79 -0.91 -1.38 -1.19 -1.15 -1.10 -0.70 
OR 0.86 -1.10 -1.14 -1.82 -1.84 -1.51 -1.53 -0.71 
PA 0.30 -0.92 -0.98 -1.44 -1.47 -1.27 -1.33 -0.63 
RI 1.02 -0.40 -0.35 -0.89 -1.05 -0.76 -0.84 -0.55 
SC 0.72 -0.66 -0.59 -1.61 -1.57 -1.11 -1.05 -0.69 
SD 1.34 -0.39 -0.27 -1.23 -1.31 -0.99 -0.98 -0.81 
TN 0.50 -0.68 -0.79 -1.39 -1.47 -1.03 -1.13 -0.68 
TX -0.13 -0.99 -0.92 -1.88 -1.63 -1.75 -1.56 -0.62 
UT 0.92 -0.59 -0.51 -1.61 -1.42 -1.46 -1.30 -0.70 
VT 1.52 0.04 -0.09 -1.17 -1.10 -0.88 -0.87 -0.78 
VA 0.48 -1.32 -1.01 -1.06 -1.00 -1.15 -1.00 -0.64 
WA 0.40 -1.68 -1.11 -2.30 -1.86 -2.14 -1.64 -0.65 
WV 1.19 -0.69 -0.70 -1.01 -0.95 -0.89 -0.86 -0.76 
WI 0.49 -0.66 -0.74 -1.42 -1.67 -1.12 -1.25 -0.67 
WY 1.49 0.00 -0.13 -1.22 -1.06 -0.94 -0.89 -0.86 
 
Table A4 Region Trade Flow GETI (Percent Change) 
    
Origin 
    
Destination Far West Lakes Mideast New Eng Plains Mountain Southeast Southwest 
Far West -0.16 -2.12 -2.53 -2.58 -1.73 -1.20 -2.23 -1.84 
Lakes -2.37 -0.09 -1.62 -1.93 -1.26 -1.95 -1.49 -2.16 
Mideast -2.49 -1.41 -0.05 -0.39 -1.79 -2.17 -1.22 -2.36 
New Eng -2.38 -1.53 -0.55 0.28 -1.74 -2.08 -1.62 -2.31 
Plains -1.82 -1.08 -1.93 -2.05 0.22 -1.14 -1.46 -1.48 
Mountain -0.97 -1.42 -1.92 -1.99 -0.80 0.61 -1.60 -1.25 
Southeast -2.08 -1.24 -1.18 -1.71 -1.31 -1.75 -0.10 -1.59 
Southwest -1.41 -1.63 -2.13 -2.24 -1.11 -1.14 -1.48 -0.13 
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Table A5 Robustness- RDiesel Included 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 PPML PPML PPML 
VARIABLES X>0 X≠S X>=0 
    
lnRDieselxlnDist -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.067*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
lnRDiesel 109.675 109.674 105.452 
 (67.05) (67.10) (70.38) 
lnDist -0.581*** -0.583*** -0.631*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Home 1.642*** 1.639*** 1.545*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) 
Region 0.324*** 0.324*** 0.324*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Neighbor 0.603*** 0.602*** 0.577*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant -54.251 -52.019 -52.440 
 (39.18) (36.11) (41.14) 
Observations 6,645 6,696 7,803 
FEit YES YES YES 
FEjt YES YES YES 
LL -2.344e+06 -2.350e+06 -2.817e+06 
Robust standard errors (clustered by State pair) in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
